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Abstract 
Ethiopia is the second largest recipient of food aid in the world, with food provided to households 
via free aid and food-for-work from government and NGO programs. This study examines the 
determinants of food security in rural Ethiopian households, focusing particularly on food aid using 
unique panel from the Centre for the Study of African Economies. The data, covering 15 rural 
villages and 1477 households, were collected in four waves in 1994, 1995, 1997, and 1999. The 
analysis is cross sectional within each survey round with a rich set of controls for household and 
production characteristics. A fixed effects model using village variation as an instrument is used to 
estimate the effect of both short term, and long term, food aid on food security at the household 
level. Key findings are that while the amount of food aid received in the last year does not have 
significant effects on food security, participation in food for work might. Long term food aid can 
have a positive or no effect dependent on commodity type. Also, the persistence of aid, as measured 
by how many years the household has received aid, has a significant negative effect on food security. 
It may be the case that the longer a household has received aid the less likely it is to reinvest in its 
factors of production. An analysis of food aid targeting shows that the major determinant of 
allocation is measures of weight for height, but the majority of the variance in distribution is 
accounted for by national level targeting to village. 
 
 
These data have been made available by the Economics Department, Addis Ababa University, the Centre for the Study of 
African Economies, University of Oxford and the International Food Policy Research Institute. Funding for data collection was 
provided by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) and 
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID); the preparation of the public release version of these data 
was supported, in part, by the World Bank. AAU, CSAE, IFPRI, ESRC, SIDA, USAID and the World Bank are not 
responsible for any errors in these data or for their use or interpretation. 
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1. Introduction 
Worldwide, a child dies every 5 seconds from hunger related causes (Barret, 2006). The 
international community has responded to the obvious nutrient deficit in developing areas with large 
quantities of food aid shipments. Millions of tons of food are given to developing nations every year 
and Ethiopia is the second largest recipient of food aid in the world. Ethiopia is a chronically food 
insecure area that suffers from continuous droughts and other highly variable harsh weather 
conditions that have prevented the country from becoming agriculturally self-sustainable 
(Quisumbing, 2003). The World Bank estimated that 51% of Ethiopian children under 5 were 
suffering from malnourishment and growth stunting in 2005. From 1984 to 1998 food aid to 
Ethiopia has totaled almost 10 million metric tons (Jayne et al. 2002). Because of the mass allocation 
of resources to this area much research has been done in an effort to assess the effectiveness of food 
aid policy. This study examines the determinants of food security for Ethiopian households, 
focusing on the effect food aid has on vulnerability to hunger. 
 It is thought that food aid is superior to cash aid because it is not as easily absorbed by 
corrupt officials, meets the immediate needs of starving people, and supports development. Critics 
of food aid argue that providing commodity goods depresses prices and creates disincentive effects 
for local food production ultimately hurting the recipient economy. Cochrane (1959) first proposed 
that the US could promote development in poor countries by distributing agriculture commodities, 
which generated the Food for Peace program. Schultz (1960) responded to Cochrane by warning 
that sending food to poor economies would have negative effects on producers in those countries 
by depressing prices and production. Food aid in this view only exacerbates the developing world’s 
dependence on richer nations and further cripples their markets. This relationship between food aid, 
production, and prices has been the focus of the majority of research on food aid.  
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 The availability of relatively comprehensive data for Ethiopian markets and its extreme 
reliance on foreign assistance has resulted in a large literature on food aid in Ethiopia and Sub-
Saharan Africa. Berrett et al. (2007) examined household level data in rural Ethiopia and found that, 
after controlling for endogeneity, food aid has no disincentive effects. The authors also estimated 
vector autoregression methods using market-level data and drew the same conclusion. Abdulai et al. 
(2005) performed a similar study on the household level in Ethiopia and found no evidence of 
production depression from food aid. Kirwan and McMillan (2007) examined wheat markets 
specifically, because they are incredibly saturated with aid. Their conclusion was that while food aid 
is unreliable and driven by donor interests as opposed to recipient need, there are no direct 
disincentive effects.  Mabuza’s (2009) study of the maize industry in Swaziland found slightly 
positive production effects from food aid in that industry. These studies seem to indicate that there 
are no negative market effects, but they do not explore effects in other facets of recipient wellbeing. 
In contrast, Gelan’s (2006) analysis of Ethiopian data provided evidence in favor of cash aid 
as opposed to food aid. His work found disincentives on local food production from increases in 
food aid. Tadesse et al. (2009) supports this finding in his work which examines the effect of food 
aid on pricing. This study found that food aid shipments accounting for over 10% of the commodity 
market have disruptive effects. Food aid shipments reduce prices in both producer and consumer 
markets for internationally traded commodities when this is the case. While this may be beneficial in 
one aspect by allowing for greater consumption due to lower prices as Levinsohn (2007) suggests, it 
may also create the production disincentive Shultz feared. This reduction in local production would 
reduce the food stock available in future periods negatively affecting future consumption. 
Another significant topic in food aid research is the effectiveness of the targeting of food 
assistance, specifically whether the most poor are receiving the most aid. Studies are generally in 
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agreement that food aid in Ethiopia is poorly targeted and is allocated disproportionately to the 
relatively more wealthy households.  Jayne et al. (2001) blames poor targeting on government 
corruption leading to a greater allocation of aid to favored regions regardless of need. Jayne et al 
(2002) offers an alternative theory of aid inertia. That is, once the food aid has been established in a 
certain area it continues to go there because the distribution infrastructure is already in place. 
Gebremedhin (2001) examined the targeting of food for work projects and drew similar conclusions 
that project placement is based primarily on project feasibility as opposed to need. Clay et al. (1999) 
also found poor targeting of food distribution and examined the relationship between food aid and 
food security. This study used weight-for-height z-scores to estimate food security. He found no 
significant relationship between the two and blames this on the lack of effective targeting. 
Gilligan et al (2007) used a difference-in-differences matching estimator on household data 
from Ethiopia to estimate the effect of emergency food aid on household consumption and found 
distinctly different results from Clay et al. (1999). This study found an increase in food consumption 
as well as an increase in consumption insecurity as a result of emergency food aid. In contrast, 
Ninno et al. (2007), using household data from India, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, and Zambia, find that 
food aid increases food security. Both of these studies measure food security by estimating and 
averaging food consumption over a long time horizon. Dercon et al. (2003) examines the 
effectiveness of food aid and informal risk sharing in smoothing the consumption curve. It was 
found that while food aid is poorly targeted it still improves consumption outcomes.  
The current literature has produced mixed results. Awokuse (2006) criticized the lack of 
rigorous empirical analysis in food aid research. There is an obvious hole in the literature in respect 
to examining the effects of food aid on the household’s non-production outcomes. Also, the 
majority of research that explores food security uses indicators such as BMI, weight-for-height 
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scores, or long term consumption as the measure of security. This paper will seek to fill a gap in the 
research by using a uniquely comprehensive panel data set for rural Ethiopian households, 
measuring the household’s food security as a function of self-reported short term consumption as 
opposed to agriculture production or health indicators, and examining both short term and long 
term aid effects. 
2. Data 
The purpose of the study is to understand how the reception of food aid affects a 
household’s vulnerability to hunger. The data used in this study are longitudinal household data 
provided by the Centre for the Study of African Economies. The data contain a sample of 1477 
households from 15 villages in rural Ethiopia collected in four waves: 1994, 1995, 1997 and 1999. 
The villages included in the survey were chosen to provide a realistic representation of diversity in 
agro-ecological zones. Within each of the villages random sampling was used to choose respondents 
stratified by female and non-female headed households to reflect the demographic trend away from 
male lead households. Sample sizes in each village were purposed to attain a self-weighting sample in 
terms of type of farming system. This data set is unique due to the comprehensive information 
gathered on household characteristics. Table 2.1 provides descriptive statistics of characteristics used 
as controls to account for differences in households.  
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Table 2.1 Household characteristics 1994 (n= 1475) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Household Characteristics 
    Number in HH 6 3.05 1 23 
Number of males 2.94 1.85 0 13 
Number of females 3.05 1.83 0 13 
Number of children 2.9 2.09 0 14 
Adult age 36.81 11.22 17 100 
Female HH head 0.22 0.415 0 1 
HH mean weight for height 0.26 0.05 0.068 0.883 
# bedrooms in house 1.33 0.69 0 9 
     Production Characteristics 
    Plot size 71.99 313.03 0 4644 
Off-farm income (Birr) 25.86 126.39 0 2200 
HH cereal stores (kg) 7.16 15.34 0 313 
Has taken loan in last 5 years 0.473 0.505 0 1 
Value of assets (Birr) 202.02 437.85 0 6000 
Year last invested in assets 80.45 5.25 30 99 
# of production assets 6.87 5.27 0 40 
Cost of prod. inputs (Birr) 27.83 67.79 0 700 
Quantity of last harvest (kg) 52.89 169.96 0 3000 
Harvest revenue (Birr) 822.33 14037.47 0 500960 
Food expenditure in last week  39.03 114.97 0 4072.85 
Livestock owned 6.57 9.31 0 91 
Livestock revenue (Birr) 52.51 162.99 0 2150 
 
Ethiopia is an ideal context to study the effects of food aid because of its long dependence 
on foreign aid. Government and NGO food aid programs deliver food, mostly in the form of 
cereals, to households via free food and food-for-work (FFW). Annually, cereal food aid alone has 
typically totaled between 2,000 and 6,000 metric tons from 1986-1995 (Dercon et al. 2003). The 
Ethiopian government has placed priority on FFW programs, but both continue to be an important 
source of nutrition for Ethiopians (Jayne et al. 2002).  
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3. Methodology 
Conceptually a household can acquire income from three sources: agriculture production, 
paid labor, and FFW programs (Quisumbing, 2003). The household budget constraint can be 
derived from these activities as a function of the time spent on each. If the household receives free 
food aid it is treated as unearned income.  
paQa(A,ta) + wtw + wffwtffw + N = pXp 
paQa is the value of the households agriculture production as a function of the households 
assets of production A and time spent on production ta. Income from paid labor is wtw with w the 
wage rate and tw time spent earning wages. Income from food for work is measured by wffwtffw where 
wffw is the in kind wages offered for time tffw spent working. N is the unearned income from free aid 
and other transfers. Consumption is measured by pXp  with X goods purchased at price p. 
Building off of this model, the effects of food aid on consumption can be identified by 
regressing consumption on each of these inputs. Because of the nature of the sample, the majority 
of households are subsistence farmers eligible for free aid, implying that all income is spent on needs. 
Needs are generally defined as physiological or biological requirements for maintaining life. This 
paper uses a self-reported measure of food consumption to indicate the availability of food under 
the assumption that eating less is not a choice based on preference, and households are consuming 
as much food as their budget constraint allows. Households that have excess income and do not fall 
under this assumption are not eligible for food aid. Non eligible households (N =0) are used as 
controls in this model. 
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Using a self-reported consumption measure allows for commodity prices to be ignored as 
the household already took them into account when actualizing its budget into consumption. The 
household factored prices in when making purchasing choices, so prices are inherently included in 
the measure of the household’s capacity to obtain food. This study employs OLS regression analysis 
to estimate the effect of food aid on household consumption according to this budget constraint. 
The primary regression will capture the effect of short term food aid by examining the effect 
of aid distributed in the last year on the household’s current access to food in each of the survey 
rounds. By using the amount of food aid the household has received in the last year as the 
independent variable, the specific effect this input in the last period has on food security at time t is 
shown. 
 The measure of household food security is how many meals per day the family consumed in 
the last week. The relatively high variation in meals-eaten-per-day, shown in table 3.1, indicates that 
it is susceptible to changes in the availability of food for a given household. This volatility makes 
meals-per-day a good measure of food security at the time of the survey. The short time horizon of 
a week sets this measure apart from the long term health indicators or consumption aggregates used 
in other studies that are more constant and cannot reflect current conditions as accurately. 
 This will be used as the dependent variable in the regression. Because meals-eaten-per-day is 
not an indicator used by food aid programs to determine distribution, some issues of endogeneity 
are avoided. Distribution is typically determined by rainfall, weight for height scores, income, or 
other measures of poverty. Using a dependent variable that is short term and not used for aid 
allocation decisions prevents correlation with the independent variable. 
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Table 3.1 Summary statistics of meals eaten per day  
Meals-eaten-per-day by HH 1994 
 
Freq. Percent 
 1 50 3.39   
2 629 42.62   
3 789 53.46   
4 8 0.54   
Total 1,476 100 
  
Meals-eaten-per-day by HH 1995  
 
Freq. Percent 
 0 1 .7   
1 62 4.2   
2 486 32.92   
3 927 62.8   
4 8 0.54   
Total 1476 100 
  
Meals-eaten-per-day by HH 1997  
 
Freq. Percent 
 1 74 5.01   
2 458 31.02   
3 938 63.55   
4 6 0.4   
Total 1476 100 
  
Meals-eaten-per-day by HH 1999  
 
Freq. Percent 
 1 64 4.33   
2 490 33.19   
3 915 61.99   
4 7 0.47   
Total 1476 100 
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The independent variable of interest will be amount of food aid received in the last year, 
measured in kilograms and delineated by free aid and participation in FFW.  
Table 3.2 Households receiving food aid by year 
Percentage of Households Receiving Food Aid 
 
1994 1995 1997 1999 
Free Food 24.11 15.04 22.92 35.23 
Food for Work 8.6 3.87 11.89 25.38 
 
Key controls include land and livestock owned, sex and age of household members, assets, 
education, family size (number of dependents), other sources of un-earned income, on and off-farm 
income, negative shocks to crops and livestock, access to credit, and harvest quantity. Village fixed 
effects are used to account for unobservable characteristics, such as cultural variation, and inherent 
differences, such as climate, between villages.  
 Controls are household characteristics that either directly affect security, like income, or 
capture a factor of production that play a role in the household’s vulnerability to hunger. Controlling 
for time varying variables that have an impact on the household’s production such as rainfall creates 
a much more realistic model for estimating changes in food security. Accounting for shocks 
prevents uncharacteristic circumstances from skewing the results. The inclusion of basic household 
characteristics such as number of children and house size prevents left out variable error due to 
inherent differences between households.  
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The primary regression specification is: 
Sit = α + βFAFAit-1 + βFFWFFWit-1 +Xitβ + εi 
Where S is the measure of food security, FA is the amount of free food aid received measured in 
100 kilogram units, FFW is the amount of food acquired via food for work programs (100 kilogram 
units), and X is the vector of controls described above.  βFA and βFFW will test the hypothesis that 
food aid has a negative effect on food security. By using current household conditions as controls 
and the amount of aid received in the past year, food aid is effectively lagged by one period.  
A second regression addresses the concern raised by existing literature that food aid has 
displacement effects of domestic production and decreases the available stock of food in further 
rounds. As food aid increases the local supply, by price depression or other mechanisms, the 
domestic production has, in some cases, been shown to decrease. This theory has been evaluated in 
the previously mentioned studies by looking at market indicators of price and supply. This study will 
examine a different facet of the issue using the same meals-per-day variable to provide a practical 
look at the household’s current access to food and a measure of food security. By using 
consumption outcomes instead of market indicators as the dependent variable, this model can 
estimate the effects of food aid on households’ capability to obtain food, as opposed to aggregated 
amounts of food on the market.  
 The data for the 1994 survey round provide greater detail of the type and amount of food 
aid received by the household in the last 30 years by recall than do later rounds; therefore this 
analysis will use only values from that year.  If domestic production is indeed being substituted by 
aid, donated commodities that are produced in the receiving area would have a negative effect on 
food security in later rounds due to decreased supply. Wheat and maize are the primary crops of the 
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sampled areas and also the majority of food aid allowing for this hypothesis to be tested with the 
following regression.  
Sit = α + βFAFAit-1 + βWFAWeatFAi + βMFAMaizeFAi + βVFAVegFAi + 
βCFACoffeeFAi + βOFAOtherFAi + βFFWFFWi + βYFAyearsi +Xiβ + εi 
The amount of food aid a household has received over the last 30 years is aggregated and 
specified by type of commodity( wheat, maize, vegetables, coffee, and other goods such as cooking 
oil) with βWFA , βMFA , βVFA , βCFA , and βOFA estimating the effect of each food type on food 
security (S) respectively. FFW is the amount of food ever received via food for work programs in 
the last 20 years with βFFW estimating the effects thereof. FAyears is the number of years the 
household has received food aid with the parameter βY showing the effect of length of food aid 
dependence. Xβ is the vector of controls for household characteristics and village fixed effects.  
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Table 3.3 Number of years household has received aid 
Years HH received Food Aid 
 
Freq. Percent 
 0 725 49.09 
 1 184 12.46 
 2 134 9.07 
 3 116 7.85 
 4 68 4.6 
 5 112 7.58 
 6 13 0.88 
 7 17 1.15 
 8 11 0.74 
 9 10 0.68 
 10 16 1.08 
 11 7 0.47 
 12 9 0.61 
 13 11 0.74 
 14 12 0.81 
 15 4 0.27 
 16 4 0.27 
 17 5 0.34 
 18 5 0.34 
 19 3 0.2 
 20 1 0.07 
 21 5 0.34 
 22 4 0.27 
 30 1 0.07 
 Total 1,477 100 
  
A third regression examining the targeting of food aid will be run with food aid received 
being the dependent variable and the household characteristics as the independent variables with 
village fixed effects as controls.  
FAit = βiincomeit + βaassetsit +βwhweight/heightit + Xitβ + εi 
This regression will reveal what types of households are actually receiving food aid and if the 
most needy are being reached. Running the model with and without village fixed effects will allow 
for different levels of targeting to be assessed.  
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4. Results 
Regressing food aid received in the last year on meals-eaten-per-day for the household produces 
the results shown in Table 4.2 when controlling for household and production characteristics within 
the Village Fixed Effects model. According to the conceptual model, changes in income, defined as 
the value of agriculture production paQa, wage labor wtw, food for work wffwtffw, and unearned 
income N, will result in changes in consumption. In this regression, income and production assets 
should have a positive relationship with consumption. The measures of agriculture production and 
income used as independent variables should therefore have positive coefficients. Because the values 
of food for work and food aid are aggregated over the last year and lagged a period behind the 
control variables this expectation does not apply to these measures.  
There are no glaring discrepancies between expectations and the signs on outputs. Harvest 
quantity has a significant positive coefficient meaning that, the more a household harvests, the more 
they eat. This is consistent with a priori expectations. However, some variables such as harvest 
revenue and off-farm income that would be expected to have a positive impact on consumption do 
not have significant coefficients in most rounds. In the case of off-farm income this could be due to 
low variation between households as few generate substantial income outside of farming. The 
insignificance of harvest revenue could point to a weakness in the model as there is not an obvious 
explanation for this result.  
Household characteristics such as mean adult age also conform to general expectations. The 
negative coefficient on mean adult age follows expectations as it is reasonable to assume that as 
adults age they become less productive and contribute less to income but consume the same amount, 
making the household more nutritionally insecure. Adverse weather shocks have negative 
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coefficients but are only significant within one round. This could be due to a higher number of 
households experiencing too much rain in this round compared to the others as is summarized in 
table 4.1. 
Table 4.1 Proportion of households experiencing negative weather shocks 
"Too much rain" 
1994 1995 1997 1999 
8.20% 16.50% 7.19% 9.10% 
 
 With no extreme contradictions to expected coefficient values and R-squared values greater 
than .3 in each round it is reasonable to draw conclusions from the model’s results. Coefficients 
without significance must be interpreted as equal to zero. 
  
 17 
 
Table 4.2 Effects of Short Term Food Aid 
Meals-per-day         
 
1994 1995 1997 1999 
          
Food aid received in last year 
(100kg) 0.000553 -0.00619 -0.00715 0.000832 
 
(0.00151) (0.00878) (0.00662) (0.00291) 
Food for work (100kg) -0.00108 -0.0361* -0.0902* -0.00116 
 
(0.00434) (0.0213) (0.0524) (0.00102) 
Off-farm income (Birr) 0.000114 0.000923 0.00342* 0.000493 
 
(0.000107) (0.000531) (0.00204) (0.00451) 
# Bedrooms in house 0.0132 0.0233 .0692* 0.0467 
 
(0.0216) (0.0394) (0.0281) (0.0275) 
Taken a loan  0.0218 0.0559 0.00585 0.00830 
 
(0.0269) (0.0274) (0.0294) (0.0317) 
Member of EQUB 0.105*** 0.021 0.00118 0.0226 
 
(0.0351) (0.0404) (0.0294) (0.0537) 
Plot size (10 hectars) -0.00224 0.00258** 0.00102 0.00167 
 
(0.00436) (0.00490) (0.00361) (0.00158) 
HH has access to grazing land 0.129*** 0.0236* 0.098 0.101* 
 
(0.0348) (0.0299) (0.0678) (.06450) 
Cost of production imputs (Birr) -0.000135 -0.00021 -0.00826 -0.00548 
 
(0.000176) (0.00034) (0.00186) (0.00363) 
Harvest quantity (100kg) 0.0166** .0191** 0.0112*** 0.0213** 
 
(0.0675) (0.00371) (0.00424) (0.00496) 
Harvest revenue (10 Birr) 0.000479 0.00525 0.00626 0.00329 
 
(0.00328) (0.00927) (0.00118) (0.00202) 
Too much rain -0.0672 -0.0602* -0.0558 -0.0301 
 
(0.0635) (0.0333) (0.0130) (0.0371) 
Too little rain -0.0251 -0.0347 -0.0352 -0.0115 
 
(0.0551) (0.0345) (0.0324) (0.0669) 
Value of livestock (10 Birr) 0.00357* 0.0382 0.0598* 0.00441* 
 
(0.00197) (0.02970) (0.03180) (0.00239) 
Livestock revenue (10 Birr) 0.000120 0.000334 0.000687* 0.000552 
 
(0.000103) (0.000215) (0.000173) (0.00038) 
# males in HH 0.183* 0.102* 0.165* 0.0402* 
 
(0.101) (0.119) (0.171) (0.100) 
# females in HH 0.173* 0.194* 0.183* 0.0190* 
 
(0.0991) (0.0998) (0.0870) (0.0104) 
# children in HH 0.00387 0.00445 0.00389 -0.00236 
 
(0.0115) (0.0225) (0.0199) (0.0253) 
Mean adult age -0.00307*** -0.00416** -0.00311*** -0.00974* 
 
(0.00113) (0.00212) (0.00144) (0.00146) 
ALP -0.0164 -0.00191 -0.00201 0.00603 
 
(0.0110) (0.00371) (0.00247) (0.0034) 
# in Household -0.0147 -0.0197 -0.0352 -0.0223 
 
(0.0972) (0.0988) (0.0525) (0.0701) 
Value of assets (10 Birr) 0.00245 0.0428 0.00356 0.00366 
 
(0.00274) (0.0276) (0.00690) (0.00301) 
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HH head female -0.0589* -0.0621* -0.0522* -0.0579* 
 
(0.0353) (0.0304) (0.0298) (0.0401) 
Atsbi -0.470*** -0.484*** -0.609*** -0.453*** 
 
(0.0986) (0.0702) (0.0859) (0.0929) 
Sebhaassahsie -0.591*** -0.513*** -0.790*** -0.577*** 
 
(0.109) (0.0788) (0.0967) (0.110) 
Ankober -0.0679 -0.0624 -0.145 -0.147 
 
(0.0958) (0.0584) (0.101) (0.0996) 
Basso -0.00796 -0.0983* -0.0447 -0.115 
 
(0.0954) (0.0568) (0.0960) (0.0968) 
Enemayi -0.166 -0.282*** -0.295*** -0.438* 
 
(0.105) (0.0673) (0.0998) -0.904 
Bugena -0.319*** -0.0328* -0.348*** -0.494*** 
 
(0.0841) (0.0438) (0.0869) (0.0807) 
Adaa 0.439*** 0.101* 0.349*** 0.407*** 
 
(0.0846) (0.0545) (0.0826) (0.0924) 
Kersa 0.390*** 0.0814* 0.237*** 0.128** 
 
(0.0880) (0.0671) (0.0916) (0.111) 
Dodota -0.259*** -0.158*** -0.284*** 0.322*** 
 
(0.0908) (0.0419) (0.0914) (0.0887) 
Shashemene 0.235*** 0.302* 0.171* 0.403*** 
 
(0.0851) (0.0356) (0.0910) (0.0994) 
Cheha 0.133* 0.155** 0.216** 0.284*** 
 
(0.0963) (0.0725) (0.0954) (0.0956) 
Kedida 0.148* 0.807*** 0.861* 0.705* 
 
(0.0978) (0.0906) (0.0973) (0.0899) 
Bule 0.499*** 0.256*** 0.385*** 0.336** 
 
(0.0814) (0.0417) (0.0809) (0.0607) 
Boloso -0.0685 -0.0340 -0.0667 -0.0449 
 
(0.0953) (0.0515) (0.0968) (0.0881) 
     Observations 1,475 1,475 1,240 1,240 
R-squared 0.347 0.316 0.367 0.343 
Robust standard errors in 
parentheses 
    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The coefficients on free food aid are statistically insignificant in each of the survey rounds. 
This indicates that short term food aid has no effect on food security and meals-eaten-per-day is 
instead determined by the vector of controls. In both 1994 and 1997, FFW has a significant negative 
coefficient at the p < .01 level. The structure of the FFW program requires participants to work on 
public projects and often requires them to be away from home for extended periods of time. A 
household that has received 100 kg from FFW programs in the last year has eaten .0361 less meals 
per day in 1997 and .0902 less meals per day in 1999. This could be a result of the allocation of labor 
to public programs instead of on the household’s own production. A reduction of labor in the past 
cultivating fields or tending livestock could cause the household to be less productive in the present. 
Since this survey was administered just after the Meher harvest if a household had allocated it’s time 
to FFW in months leading up to the harvest it could have had negative implications for harvest 
results currently affecting the household. 
 The second regression, using the extensive data from the 1994 survey, produces the results 
found in table 4.4. The nature of the OLS regression allows for the coefficients to be interpreted as 
marginal effects, that is, the coefficients represent the change in the value of the dependent variable 
for a one unit change in the related control variable. Because the first regression showed generally 
consistent relationships through rounds, this model can be viewed as characteristic of sample 
behavior in general and not confined to the sample year.  
In the results, household access to grazing land, value of livestock, and harvest quantities 
continue to have significant positive effects on food security. This is predicted by the positive 
relationship between the value of the household’s agricultural production and consumption. Harvest 
revenue has an insignificant coefficient once again contradicting expectations. It is possible that 
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households eligible for food aid do not generate revenue from their harvest and keep output for 
consumption. Table 4.3 shows summary statistics of harvest revenue. 
Table 4.3 1994 Harvest revenue 
1994 Harvest revenue 
(Birr) 
 
Freq. Percent 
0 755 51.15 
>0 - 50 123 8.34 
>50-100 240 16.27 
>100-400 273 18.49 
>400 85 5.75 
Total 1476 100 
 
Over 50% of households report having no harvest revenues. This lack of variation could account for 
the lack of significance.  
Demographic characteristics of number of males and females have significant positive 
coefficients. This fits into the conceptual model in that for each additional adult the household’s 
supply of labor increases allowing for increased income. Likewise, mean adult age has a negative 
affect which follows the assumption that as age increases productivity decreases cause labor supply 
to decline. EQUB membership (discussed further in regards to targeting), a savings and loan 
association that insulates households from risk, has a significant positive coefficient indicating that 
the mechanisms of the organization are decreasing member household’s vulnerability to hunger. 
Once again the control coefficients generally follow expectations and the R-squares are sufficiently 
high to treat the model as meaningful. 
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Table 4.4 Effects of Long Term Food Aid 
1994 Meals-per-day         
 
Total FA 
FA by 
commodity Total FA 
FA by 
commodity 
          
Food aid received in last year 
(100kg) 0.00121 0.00216 0.00111 0.00204 
 
(0.00165) (0.00182) (0.00165) (0.00185) 
Total food aid received (100kg) -0.0256 
 
-0.00934 
 
 
(0.0341) 
 
-0.0348 
 Wheat food aid (100kg) 
 
-0.00684 
 
-0.00530 
  
(0.00396) 
 
(0.00402) 
Maize food aid (100kg) 
 
-0.0282 
 
-0.0231 
  
-0.0163 
 
(0.0165) 
Vegetable food aid (100kg) 
 
0.0740** 
 
0.0973*** 
  
-0.034 
 
(0.0320) 
Coffee food aid (100kg) 
 
0.00102* 
 
0.00110** 
  
(0.00554) 
 
(0.00544) 
Other food aid (100kg) 
 
0.0025 
 
0.00395 
  
(0.00221) 
 
(0.00241) 
Years received food aid 
  
-0.0119** -0.0146** 
   
(0.00586) (0.00612) 
Food for work (100kg) -0.000454 -0.000827 -0.000183 0.000104 
 
(0.00424) (0.00418) (0.00423) (0.00418) 
Off-farm income (Birr) 0.000112 0.000106 0.000120 0.000114 
 
(0.000108) (0.000111) (0.000107) (0.000110) 
# bedrooms in house 0.0108 0.00912 0.0101 0.00839 
 
(0.0213) (0.0212) (0.0213) (0.0211) 
Value of production assets 0.00247 0.00225 0.00244 0.00214 
 
(0.00276) (0.00276) (0.00277) (0.00276) 
Taken a loan in last 5 years 0.0244 0.0232 0.0262 0.0250 
 
(0.0269) (0.0269) (0.0268) (0.0268) 
Member of EQUB 0.102*** 0.0981*** 0.101*** 0.0981*** 
 
(0.0351) (0.0351) (0.0350) (0.0349) 
Plot size (10 hectars) -0.00227 -0.00254 -0.00248 -0.00273 
 
(0.00442) (0.00441) (0.00442) (0.00441) 
HH has access to grazing land 0.133*** 0.135*** 0.136*** 0.138*** 
 
(0.0351) (0.0352) (0.0351) (0.0351) 
Cost of production imputs (Birr) -0.000111 -0.000104 -0.000114 -0.000105 
 
(0.000178) (0.000178) (0.000178) (0.000178) 
Quantity harvested (100kg) 0.0173** 0.0167** 0.0179*** 0.0175** 
 
(0.00684) (0.00686) (0.00679) (0.00681) 
Harvest revenue (100 Birr) -0.0000235 -0.0000281 -0.0000237 -0.0000296 
 
(0.0000418) (0.0000461) (0.0000424) (0.0000484) 
Too much rain -0.0689 -0.0665 -0.0687 -0.0665 
 
(0.0638) (0.0634) (0.0636) (0.0633) 
Too little rain -0.0224 -0.0207 -0.0224 -0.0218 
 
(0.0552) (0.0552) (0.0550) (0.0548) 
Value of livestock (10 Birr) 0.0374* 0.0374* 0.0372* 0.0370* 
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(0.0196) (0.0196) (0.0196) (0.0196) 
Livestock revenue (10 Birr) 0.00125 0.00124 0.00124 0.00123 
 
(0.00103) (0.00103) (0.00102) (0.00102) 
# of males in HH 0.189* 0.192* 0.187* 0.192* 
 
(0.102) (0.102) (0.101) (0.101) 
# of females in HH 0.174* 0.177* 0.173* 0.177* 
 
(0.0995) (0.0994) (0.0990) (0.0989) 
# of children in HH 0.00357 0.00259 0.00361 0.00286 
 
(0.0116) (0.0113) (0.0115) (0.0113) 
Mean adult age (adult >17) -0.00322*** -0.00345*** -0.00293** -0.00314*** 
 
(0.00113) (0.00114) (0.00114) (0.00115) 
ALP -0.0158 -0.0153 -0.0155 -0.0150 
 
(0.0111) (0.0110) (0.0111) (0.0110) 
# of HH members -0.149* -0.153* -0.148* -0.152* 
 
(0.0975) (0.0973) (0.0970) (0.0969) 
Atsbi -0.474*** -0.424*** -0.462*** -0.390*** 
 
(0.103) (0.108) (0.103) (0.109) 
Sebhaassahsie -0.611*** -0.624*** -0.584*** -0.578*** 
 
(0.107) (0.112) (0.108) (0.114) 
Ankober -0.0713 -0.0571 -0.0553 -0.0263 
 
(0.0954) (0.0974) (0.0956) (0.0982) 
Basso -0.0217 -0.00583 -0.0421 -0.0176 
 
(0.0943) (0.0975) (0.0947) (0.0968) 
Enemayi -0.173* -0.158 -0.193* -0.169 
 
(0.105) (0.107) (0.105) (0.107) 
Bugena -0.331*** -0.339*** -0.229** -0.213** 
 
(0.0831) (0.0821) (0.0980) (0.0992) 
Adaa 0.427*** 0.442*** 0.406*** 0.430*** 
 
(0.0836) (0.0869) (0.0839) (0.0862) 
Kersa 0.373*** 0.384*** 0.363*** 0.386*** 
 
(0.0875) (0.0909) (0.0872) (0.0901) 
Dodota -0.285*** -0.281*** -0.280*** -0.262*** 
 
(0.0896) (0.0927) (0.0893) (0.0927) 
Shashemene 0.223*** 0.238*** 0.203** 0.226*** 
 
(0.0845) (0.0877) (0.0848) (0.0869) 
Cheha 0.125 0.156 0.116 0.155 
 
(0.0962) (0.0991) (0.0958) (0.0981) 
Kedida 0.143 0.164 0.125 0.154 
 
(0.0981) (0.100) (0.0981) (0.0996) 
Bule 0.501*** 0.516*** 0.481*** 0.505*** 
 
(0.0815) (0.0848) (0.0818) (0.0840) 
Boloso -0.0813 -0.0616 -0.0891 -0.0591 
 
(0.0948) (0.0969) (0.0944) (0.0961) 
     Observations 1,475 1,475 1,475 1,475 
R-squared 0.345 0.349 0.347 0.351 
Robust standard errors in 
parentheses 
    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 The model was run first with an aggregated variable of total food aid received in the last 30 
years and food aid in the last year to parallel the first regression. Both the coefficients are 
insignificant meaning that this model estimates the effect of these food aid categories on food 
security as 0. However, adding in commodity specification to the long term food aid variable results 
in positive coefficients on vegetable and coffee aid. The coefficients on total, wheat, and maize food 
aid are negative as was suspected by the literature that finds displacement effects. However, the 
coefficients are insignificant so wheat and maize food aid can be interpreted as having no effect on 
food security.  
 Vegetable and coffee food aid both have significant positive coefficients. OLS allows us to 
interpret these as marginal effects on meals-per-day. Vegetable food aid has the largest effect with 
every 100 kg increase causing a .0104 increase in meals the household eats per day. Because 
vegetables are not a cash crop in this area, that is households producing vegetables are doing so 
mainly for their own consumption as opposed to for sale, it is reasonable to infer that food aid in 
this form would not have disincentive effects. An increase in the supply of vegetables is unlikely to 
have any effects other than on the recipient household at that time. Also, as vegetables have a higher 
nutritional value than cereals, it is possible that they have a positive impact on household health and 
productivity is increased. Similarly, households are unlikely to treat coffee as substitutes for their 
own production. These foods would likely supplement their consumption, but have little to do with 
production decisions. 
 Table 4.5 shows the total amounts of each commodity distributed by village and the per 
household amount of each food type.  
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Table 4.5 Distribution of long term food aid by commodity 
Commodity amounts (kg) by village 
(amount per receiving household in parentheses) 
 
Wheat FA Maize FA Veg FA Coffee FA Other FA 
Atsbi 123292.5 0 0 4143 1015 
  (1503.56)  - - (50.52) (12.37) 
Sebhaassahsie 20646 2 371 11315.5 1288.5 
  (327.71) (0.031) (5.88) (179.61) (20.45) 
Ankober 2949 143 178 495 892 
  (40.39) (1.95) (2.43) (6.78) (12.22) 
Basso  0 0 0 0 0 
   - - -  -   - 
Enemyai 65 0 0 0 0 
  (16.25)  -  - -  -  
Bugena 10968.65 710.5 3082.75 5533.35 7907 
  (74.61) (4.83) (20.97) (37.64) (53.79) 
Adaa 0 0 0 0 0 
   -  -  -  -  - 
Kersa 2343 0 80.5 107 415 
  (37.79)  - (1.29) (1.72) (6.69) 
Dodota 12409 25 142.75 0 500 
  (114.89) (0.23) (1.32) -  (4.62) 
Shashemene 106 62.5 2 0 1.33 
  (13.25) (7.81) (0.25)  - (0.16) 
Cheha 72.5 438.5 58.66 752 107.33 
  (1.42) (8.59) (1.15) (14.74) (2.10) 
Kedida  768.5 235.5 0 0 42 
  (32.02) (9.81)  -  - (1.75) 
Bule 0 0 0 0 0 
   -  -  -  -  - 
Boloso 1722 321 2 94.5 131 
  (25.32) (4.72) (0.029) (1.38) (1.92) 
Gardula 2002 455 1124.5 58 4536 
  (32.81) (7.46) (18.43) (0.95) (74.36) 
 
 Wheat aid clearly composes the majority of aid distributed however it does not have a 
significant effect on food security in this model while vegetable and coffee food aid do. In the case 
of coffee food aid it is possible that recipient households are supplementing their income as 
opposed to consumption by selling or trading it. The amount of coffee being allocated to recipient 
 25 
 
households is relatively large with values as high as 179 kg per household in Sebhaassahsie. This is 
especially true for a good that does not provide caloric value and is used in small amounts. This 
raises suspicion as to the ends of coffee food aid. If it is being sold and generating income, that 
income could be invested on the household’s capabilities making it more productive in the future.  
The distribution of vegetable food aid is not as telling. It seems likely that the positive effect 
of this commodity arises from qualities inherent to the good. The nutritional content of vegetables 
gives them reasonably different health effects than consumption of wheat and maize. These inherent 
differences in nutrition could be responsible for the positive coefficient and significance. 
The new variable years received food aid is introduced in the last two columns of table 4.4. 
These regressions are purposed to show the effect of length of food aid participation on food 
security. This specification is run with both the aggregated long term food aid variable, and specified 
by crop. The model produces results consistent with the first two regressions for short term, long 
term, wheat, maize, vegetable, coffee, and other food aid, as well as the controls. This gives validity 
to the results for years received. In both specifications years received food aid has a significant 
negative coefficient.  
 The most economically significant result in the model is this coefficient on years received. 
For every additional year the household has received food aid, regardless of type or amount, meals-
eaten-per-day decreases by .0142. For a household who has received food aid for 20 years this 
means a decrease of .278 meals per day. This is an 11% decrease from the mean of 2.5 meals per day. 
This coefficient points to a new issue that is unaddressed by the current literature. The length of 
time the household has received food aid having negative effects on food security brings the issue 
into a different realm. This result is not likely a result of production displacement as the amount of 
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food aid received is being controlled for. As opposed to a market effect, the length of dependence 
may have behavioral effects on the household’s decision making process.   
If a household receives food aid for an extended amount of time it is likely that the 
household begins to take this income into its budget constraint as a guaranteed source of 
consumption. Food aid may function as an expected safety net for households who have received it 
for a long time. This could lead to a different allocation of resources than would occur without the 
expectation of help. In this case of persistent food aid, aid agencies are acting as a form of predicted 
insurance taking on some of the risk of the household. It is possible that this leads to moral hazard 
on behalf of the household where the urgency to maximize production is lessened. A household that 
does not expect to receive food aid in the next year may take greater lengths to increase its security 
for that year. 
 This hypothesis suggests that E(N) in the budget constraint is somehow substituting other 
inputs for the same expected consumption. Time could be the substituted good. The household 
chooses how much time it spends on each activity (agriculture, wage labor, food for work) including 
leisure with the time constraint as follows: 
T = ta + tw + tffw + L 
If moral hazard is causing a reallocation of time from productive to leisure based activities 
on the assurance of food aid in the next period, agriculture productivity could be compromised. This 
would decrease the resources available to the household and the household would be less 
nutritionally secure. The household’s moral hazard is acting less responsible in ensuring its food 
security because food aid programs are insulating it to risk. To test this hypothesis, how many years 
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the household has received food aid is regressed against days worked on farm in the last month as 
the dependent variable with the same vector of household controls. 
βdDaysi = βyFAyearsi + Xiβ + εi 
 This regression produced insignificant results that can be interpreted as number of years a 
household has received food aid has no effect on the amount of time they spend working their land. 
However, this survey was administered in the months after the largest harvest of the year and it is 
possible that the last month of work was not typical or representative of how much work is done in 
harvest or planting times.  
Table 4.6 Time spent working on farm 
Days worked on farm in last month 
 
Freq. Percent 
 0 767 52 
 1-5 128 9 
 6-10 288 20 
 11-15 125 8 
 16-20 83 6 
 21-25 51 3 
 26+ 34 2 
 Total 1,476 100 
  
Table 4.6 shows that over 50% of households have reported 0 days worked in the last month. 
The overriding factor affecting days worked in this sample appears to be the time of survey 
administration being after the harvest making all other factors irrelevant. This prevents any 
meaningful tests on this variable. 
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Therefore, rest of the income equation must be explored for other possible sources of a 
decrease in productivity. Because the wage rate w and wffw are exogenous to the household’s budget 
constraint, the household’s decisions do not affect these inputs. The value of agriculture output is 
determined by PaQa, Pa is exogenous and Qa is a function of A and ta. Time has already been 
examined leaving A, agricultural assets, as the remaining factor the household controls. Land 
ownership is allocated by the government and thus can also be treated as exogenous. Assets of 
production are left for the household to control.  
 If the household has a decreased dependence on their own productive capability due to the 
expectation of food aid in future rounds, it is possible that they redirect their current resources to 
areas other than investing in that production capacity. In this way, persistent food aid may 
discourage the household from improving its factors of production. The data do not allow for 
regression analysis but simple cross tabs of years received food aid and how recently the household 
invested in their own factors of production are very telling. By looking at the households that have 
received food aid for a certain time period and how many of those households have invested in their 
production assets in subsequent years it can be seen if there is a difference in behavior.  
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Table 4.7 Years received food aid and HH investment in factors of production 
HH received FA at least: Household has invested in assets of prod. in last: 
 10 years 
  15 years No Yes 
  No 1,068 365 1,433 
  74% 26% 100% 
Yes 31 13 44 
 
 
70% 30% 100% 
 
 
1,099 378 1,477 
 
     
 
5 years 
  10 years No Yes 
  No 1,323 55 1,378 
  96% 4% 100% 
Yes 90 9 99 
 
 
91% 9% 100% 
 
 
1,413 64 1,477 
 
     4 years 
  5 years No Yes 
  No 1,177 38 1,215 
  96% 4% 100% 
Yes 239 23 262 
 
 
91% 9% 100% 
 
 
1,416 61 1,477 
 
     3 years 
  4 years No Yes 
  No 1,114 33 1,147 
  97% 3% 100% 
Yes 304 26 330 
 
 
92% 8% 100% 
 
 
1,418 59 1,477 
 
    
 
2 years 
  3 years No Yes 
  No 999 32 1,031 
  96% 4% 100% 
Yes 420 26 446 
 
 
94% 6% 100% 
 
 
1,419 58 1,477 
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1 years 
  2 years No Yes 
  No 869 28 897 
  96% 4% 100% 
Yes 550 26 576 
 
 
95% 5% 100% 
 
 
1,419 54 1,473 
  
 Table 4.7 reveals that no fewer households that have received food aid in years prior, 
invested in their factors of production in the subsequent years. That is, households who have 
received food aid are not less likely to have taken action to improve their production assets. Granted, 
this analysis is limited due to lack of controls, but does not provide evidence for the presence of 
moral hazard with persistent aid.  
Households may still be treating aid agencies as a form of informal, in-kind insurance against 
hunger risk but this exercise indicates that a decrease in investment is not the mechanism in play. 
However, running a t-test on asset investment year by a food aid dummy produces a significant 
difference of -.575 at the p <.05 level. This result means that the difference in the means of 
investment year for those who have received food aid and those who have not are significantly 
different. The difference can be interpreted as the mean household that has received food aid has 
invested in its assets .575 years earlier than the mean household never receiving food aid. This 
suggests that, generally, households who have received food aid have older, or less improved assets 
of production. Once again, this analysis is limited from a lack of controls but, it provides some 
evidence of differences in investment behavior between these subgroups. This data set does not 
provide the information necessary to test this hypothesis further in a meaningful way so further 
research in this field is necessary.  
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For a household’s expectation of a certain amount of food aid E(N) to have negative effects 
on food security, there must be some time when that expectation is not met and the household has 
an income deficit. Variation in food aid targeting must be present for this to occur or the 
household’s expectation would always be met and food security would not be compromised. Table 
4.8 shows that the variation of food aid by village is relatively high. 
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Table 4.8 Variation in food aid distribution 
Households receiving food aid by village 
 
1994 1995 1997 1999 
Atsbi 79% 5% 79% 33% 
Sebhaassahsie 35% 2% 12% 24% 
Ankober 0% 3% 65% 44% 
Basso  0% 0% 6% 31% 
Enemyai 0% 5% 11% 0% 
Bugena 96% 69% 7% 89% 
Adaa 0% 1% 61% 0% 
Kersa 0% 5% 4% 6% 
Dodota 98% 28% 64% 28% 
Shashemene 0% 9% 22% 0% 
Cheha 0% 30% 7% 3% 
Kedida  0% 10% 33% 0% 
Bule 0% 0% 5% 0% 
Boloso 9% 1% 2% 0% 
Gardula 1% 9% 17% 8% 
 
The proportion of households receiving aid is not constant from year to year meaning that 
households receiving food aid one year may receive none in the next. This could be due to the 
households having enough income to not need aid, or from changes in program targeting. 
Targeting of food aid is vital for the program to be effective. The goal is to reach the most 
food insecure households. Most research has shown that targeting to villages is highly political and 
follows inertia as opposed to need (Jayne et al. 2002). Targeting occurs on two levels, nationally 
from government or NGO programs to selected villages, and locally within village. There is also a 
third level of allocation that is self-selection of the household itself choosing to participate. 
 The following regression employs OLS with food aid as the independent variable to identify 
what types of households are receiving aid. Results both with and without village fixed effects are 
shown to assess different levels of targeting. The first model without fixed effects estimates what the 
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determinants of aid are on the whole nationally. The inclusion of village fixed effects shows the 
determinants of aid allocation within village. Food aid allocation to households is distributed by 
village governments from the stocks given to them from a national source. Therefore, the first level 
of targeting is from NGO or Ethiopian government to village then the second level from village 
officials to household. FFW is largely targeted via self-selection as if an individual could generate 
more income from the private sector instead of program participation he would not self-select. 
Therefore, this study only examines free aid targeting. Results are shown in table 4.9.  
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Table 4.9 Village level targeting of food aid 
1994 Food aid (10kg)      
VARIABLES 
 
Village Fixed 
Effects 
      
Female HH head 1.661*** -0.124 
 
(0.571) (0.517) 
Weight for height -20.54*** -8.288** 
 
(5.694) (4.120) 
Value of assets -0.0605*** 0.00315 
 
(0.0223) (0.0167) 
# bedrooms in house 0.503 0.357 
 
(0.298) (0.236) 
Kg of cereals stored by HH -0.0179* 0.00118 
 
(0.00975) (0.00428) 
HH taken loan in last 5 years -0.135 0.235 
 
(0.403) (0.367) 
Member of EQUB -2.106*** -0.303** 
 
(0.302) (0.148) 
Plot size -0.00108*** -0.000111 
 
(0.000272) (8.97e-05) 
HH has access to grazing land 0.218 0.115 
 
(0.393) (0.375) 
Cost of production imputs 0.0152*** 0.00225 
 
(0.00361) (0.00263) 
Harvest Quantity -0.00198** 0.000509 
 
(0.000911) (0.000476) 
Harvest Revenue -4.00e-06 1.19e-06 
 
(3.00e-06) (1.13e-06) 
Too much rain -2.840*** -0.0313 
 
(0.351) (0.0909) 
Too little rain -3.286*** -0.0111 
 
(0.358) (0.0940) 
Livestock owned 0.0317 -0.00654 
 
(0.0169) (0.0127) 
Livestock revenue 0.000113 0.00285 
 
(0.00151) (0.00123) 
# males in HH 1.294 1.853 
 
(1.639) (1.472) 
# females in HH 1.224 2.021 
 
(1.532) (1.386) 
# children in HH 0.0630 0.0423 
 
(0.143) (0.113) 
Mean adult age (>17) -0.0143 -0.00493 
 
(0.0162) (0.0148) 
ALP 0.445 0.0433 
 
(0.102) (0.0544) 
# in HH -2.247 -2.026 
 
(1.582) (1.430) 
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Atsbi 
 
15.71*** 
  
(2.223) 
Sebhaassahsie 
 
6.068*** 
  
(2.170) 
Ankober 
 
0.167 
  
(0.186) 
Basso 
 
-0.102 
  
(0.327) 
Enemayi 
 
0.305 
  
(0.197) 
Bugena 
 
2.914*** 
  
(0.343) 
Adaa 
 
-0.0286 
  
(0.391) 
Kersa 
 
-0.371 
  
(0.434) 
Dodota 
 
11.33*** 
  
(0.641) 
Shashemene 
 
0.104 
  
(0.215) 
Cheha 
 
-0.00479 
  
(0.265) 
Kedida 
 
-0.463** 
  
(0.227) 
Bule 
 
0.320 
  
(0.339) 
Boloso 
 
0.116 
  
(0.317) 
   Observations 1,475 1,475 
R-squared 0.096 0.378 
Robust standard errors in 
parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Most results are consistent with expectations when considering the politics of aid programs. In 
the model without fixed effects female headed households are shown to receive extra aid with a 
significant coefficient of 1.661. This means that households identical in every other way being 
controlled for will receive more aid if headed by a female. Targeting aid towards women has been a 
finding in various studies including Jayne et al. (2002) using data from Ethiopia in this time period. 
Women development has become an institutionalized goal by many aid programs under the theory 
that women handle income more responsibly and is included in the UN’s Millennium Development 
Goals (Clay et al. 1999).  
Other significant variables in the first model relate to the household’s general wealth. How much 
land is allocated to the household, cereal stores, harvest quantity, and value of assets all have 
negative coefficients so as these measures of wealth increase, food aid received decreases. This 
would point to effective targeting to more poor households. However the measures of adverse 
rainfall have coefficients that do not follow expectations. Negative coefficients on both too much 
and too little rain suggest that households that undergo negative weather shocks receive less aid. 
These variables are all time-varying. Due to the costs of targeting it is possible that aid is 
unresponsive to factors that change frequently. Quisumbing (2003) found food aid and food for 
work programs to be highly determined by weight for height scores and insensitive to shocks to 
both crops and livestock. 
Weight for height has a significant coefficient of -20.54 without fixed effects and -8.288 in the 
second model. Weight for height scores are an accessible measure of malnutrition and cited as a 
targeting mechanism by aid agencies (Jayne et al. 2001). This variable is one of only two that retain 
its significance in the fixed effects model. The loss of significance of other variables and the decrease 
in magnitude on the significant coefficients indicate that the main source for the variation in the 
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distribution of food aid is targeting to village. The first model has a very low R-squared value which 
increases to .378 with fixed effects affirming this conclusion. The probable explanation for this is 
that aid agencies save costs by targeting low income villages and within villages, aid goes to those 
with low weight for height.  
The second variable that maintains its significance is EQUB membership. The variable has a 
negative coefficient of .303 meaning that member households receive 3.03 kg less aid than non-
members. This is not a large amount of food but the significance does point out subgroup of 
households that are receiving less food aid by a classification they chose to be in. EQUB is a savings 
and loan association that requires periodic deposits from the household and allows for withdraws 
and loans at little to no interest rate. This organization insulates households to risk and provides a 
resource to turn to other than aid. It is likely that households who are members make withdraws to 
account for deficits in their budget constraint as opposed to participation in food aid. EQUB 
membership had a significant positive coefficient in 1994 in both regressions indicating that 
membership also has positive effects on food security.  
5. Conclusions 
Food aid has been, and will undoubtedly continue to be, an important policy option for 
addressing hunger in Ethiopia and other developing nations. While it’s hard to argue against giving 
starving children bread, it is vital to consider long term consequences of food aid policies in order to 
maximize welfare and promote development in recipient nations. This research adds to the literature 
devoted to exploring the effects of food aid on beneficiaries by looking at effects on household 
consumption as opposed to production, and examining a unique dependent variable as a measure of 
food security in a village fixed effects model. 
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 The analysis reveals that short term food aid has no effect on the measure of food security in 
all four survey years. Food for work participation however, decreased food security for two of the 
tested rounds. This program requires aid recipients to work on public projects in exchange for the 
in-kind wage. It is possible that reallocating labor from the household’s own production to FFW can 
compromise its productivity in further rounds. FFW participation is not significant in the long term 
model so this paper produced no further evidence for this effect. Further research is warranted as to 
the effects of FFW on household production particularly at different times of the growing season. 
This data set does not provide information necessary to test this hypothesis. 
The model examining long term food aid produced evidence of vegetable and coffee food aid 
having positive effects on food security while other types of commodities have no significant effect. 
Descriptive statistics suggest that households may be supplementing their income as opposed to/ as 
well as consumption with coffee aid. Vegetables’ inherent nutritional benefits could increase the 
health and productivity of the house more than cereal aid increasing the household’s capability to 
provide for itself. 
 The key finding is the negative relationship between food security and number of years 
received food aid. The more years a household has been receiving food aid , the less food secure it is. 
It is possible that households are developing moral hazard from expected food aid values and 
variation in targeting sometimes causes households to not receive their expected value. A household 
that expects to receive food aid may be experiencing moral hazard and not be as motivated to 
maximize its production as a household that does not expect help. The mechanisms of this 
hypothesized behavior were explored via information on days worked on household farm and 
investment in production assets. The limitations of the data set prevent conclusive evidence but 
descriptive statistics and tests present trends both against and supporting the hypothesis. Once again, 
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further work is necessitated to test the result years received aid decreases food security and to 
discover the means by which this occurs.  
This analysis of food aid targeting is general but reveals the major mechanisms at work in 
distribution decisions. On the household level, weight-for-height scores are the main source of 
variation in aid within this model. This finding is in line with other research on targeting which 
describes weight-for-height as a measure of household nutrition that is easier to obtain than other 
health indicators. The lower costs of gathering this information and objective nature of z-scores 
make it widely used for targeting needy households. However, the addition of fixed effects reduces 
the magnitude of weight-for-height’s coefficient and removes significance from other household 
characteristics. This change reveals that the large majority in variation of food aid distribution is in 
fact based on village level targeting, not household level. Generally poorer villages receive aid while 
relatively more wealthy villages may receive none, despite the possible presence of the neediest 
households in the wealthier village. Targeting at the village level reduces costs, but may have 
drawbacks for poor households in non-poor areas.  
There is evidence of both positive and negative effects of food aid on household food security 
in this study. As further research is done and more facets of the issue are brought to light, hopefully 
food aid programs can become more effective in achieving their goal of reducing hunger, and saving 
lives. Help is needed in poor areas, but the consequences of that help must be considered in order to 
truly increase recipient welfare. 
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